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Abstract
This paper considers Kamp and Partee’s account of graded membership within a
conceptual spaces framework and puts the account to the test in the domain of
colors. Three experiments are reported which are meant to determine, on the one
hand, the regions in color space where the typical instances of blue and green are
located and, on the other hand, the degrees of blueness/greenness of various shades
in the blue–green region as judged by human observers. From the locations of
the typical blue and typical green regions in conjunction with Kamp and Partee’s
account follow degrees of blueness/greenness for the color shades we are interested
in. These predicted degrees are compared with the judged degrees, as obtained
in the experiments. The results of the comparison support the account of graded
membership at issue.
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1 Introduction
Formal semantics is the study of truth and meaning with the help of logico-mathematical
machinery. The main formal tool used in this area has traditionally been classical set
theory. This has allowed researchers to model the truth of an atomic sentence 𝑃(𝑎) in
terms of the item denoted by the constant 𝑎 being included in the set denoted by the
predicate 𝑃. Much research in formal semantics is concerned with generalizing this basic
model to languages containing sentences of arbitrary complexity, and also containing
various modal (“possibly,” “necessarily”), temporal (“earlier,” “later”), deontic (“must,”
“may”), and other operators.
Even the richest formal semantic models are, as a rule, idealized in that they assume
predicates to either apply or not apply to any given item, thereby ignoring the fact that
many natural-language predicates are vague to some extent and can thus apply—intuitively
speaking—to intermediate degrees as well. An exception to this rule is the semantics
presented in Kamp and Partee (1995), which explicitly aims at modeling vagueness of
meaning in the context of prototype theory, specifically by defining a graded membership
relation in terms of similarity to prototypical instances. This relation permits one to say
things such as that the sentence “This apple is red” is true to a degree of .2 because the
designated apple is a member to a degree of .2 of the set of red things.
Kamp and Partee acknowledged in their paper that the account of gradedmembership
they propose is incomplete, given that in general it will fail to determine a unique graded
membership function for all vague predicates in a language. It has recently been shown,
however, that Kamp and Partee’s proposal can be completed by embedding it within
the conceptual spaces approach to concepts, which is enjoying growing popularity in
cognitive science and cognitive psychology (see, e.g., Gärdenfors, 2000, 2014). Specifically,
Decock and Douven (2014) show how combining Kamp and Partee’s account with the
conceptual spaces approach helps one to arrive at a unique graded membership relation,
and Douven and Decock (2016) show how this relation can be used to define a unique
relation of graded truth.
Since Tarski’s (1935) seminal work on truth, two conditions have beenwidely accepted
as adequacy criteria for any formal semantics, to wit, formal correctness and material
adequacy. The formermeans that the semantics ought to be consistent—free of conflicting
assignments of truth values—and the latter means that the semantics ought to capture the
actual meanings of the terms in the language it aims to model, which in turn means that
it ought to be in accordance with the linguistic behavior of competent speakers of the
language. Douven and Decock (2016) proved the formal correctness of the conceptual
spaces version of Kamp and Partee’s semantics. But while it was recognized in Decock
and Douven (2014) that, in this new version, the semantics has clear empirical content,
the question of its material adequacy is still open.
The present paper reports empirical studies that aimed to take some first steps toward
answering the question of material adequacy by applying the conceptual spaces version
of Kamp and Partee’s account to the domain of colors and querying whether, and if so to
what extent, it makes the right predictions about people’s use of (vague) color predicates.
In particular, we obtained the data necessary to let Kamp and Partee’s account (in the
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said version) predict the degrees to which various color patches in the blue–green range
are blue (or green), and then obtained further data on the degrees to which these patches
were judged to be blue (or green) by human observers. The results will be seen to support
Kamp and Partee’s account. Needless to say, the empirical content of their account goes
far beyond the color domain, let alone people’s judgments of the degrees of blueness
(greenness) of certain color patches. We comment on this and other limitations of the
current experimental work in Section 3. The general discussion (Section 7) suggests
some ways in which future work may overcome these limitations. In that section, we also
contrast the conceptual spaces version of Kamp and Partee’s semantics with the main
extant psychological accounts of vague categorization.
2 Theoretical background
According to prototype theory, some instances of a concept are more representative for
that concept than others, and the most representative instance is the prototype of the
concept (see, e.g., Rosch, 1973, 1978, and Rosch & Mervis, 1975). When looking for a
membership relation that admits of degrees, one might be tempted to equate degree of
membership with similarity to prototype. For instance, one might think that the degree to
which a given shade is red equals the similarity of that shade to prototypical red. However,
this idea will not work, as Osherson and Smith (1981) pointed out long ago. For example,
while shades of crimson are less typically red than shades of scarlet, they are nonetheless
regarded as being red to the fullest degree (but see Barsalou, 1987).
For some, this observation has been a reason to dismiss as hopeless any attempt
to define graded membership via similarity to prototypes. As Kamp and Partee argue,
however, the observation at most militates against the thought that graded membership
can be equated with similarity to prototype; it does not imply that similarity relations
and prototypes cannot serve as a basis for an account of graded membership. In their
1995 paper, Kamp and Partee set out to show exactly how one can craft from those
ingredients a relation of graded membership. They do so by considering a language
with what they call “simple predicates” (predicates like “fish,” “red,” “tall,” and others
which have monolexemic expressions in English), and by constructing a semantics for
this language that can account for the vagueness of those predicates (insofar as they are
vague).
Kamp and Partee’s semantics for their language consists of three parts: a domain of
discourse, a partial model, and a set of completions. The domain of discourse is the set of
all items the language allows one to talk about. The partial model assigns to each predicate
in the language an extension and an anti-extension, where the union of these need not
comprise the whole domain of discourse. The extension of a predicate consists of those
items to which the predicate determinately applies, and the anti-extension consists of
those items to which the predicate determinately fails to apply; but there may still be items
remaining to which the predicate neither determinately applies nor determinately fails to
apply. Completions are ways of handling these indeterminate cases. A completion assigns
some of the indeterminate cases to the extension of the predicate and the remainder to
the anti-extension.
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Early attempts to deal with vagueness along these same lines considered all logically
possible ways of splitting up the indeterminate cases of a predicate, declaring a sentence
to be true if and only if it remains true no matter how the indeterminate cases are split
up. The novelty of Kamp and Partee’s proposal is that they only consider those ways
of splitting up the indeterminate cases that respect orderings of similarity to prototype,
meaning that if 𝑎 is more similar to the 𝑃 prototype than 𝑏 is, then every completion that
assigns 𝑏 to the 𝑃 extension should also assign 𝑎 to the 𝑃 extension, but not necessarily
vice versa. To use their example, if both Alma and Bob are neither determinately adult
nor determinately not adult, but Bob ismore adult than Alma, then every admissible way
of splitting up the indeterminate cases of adulthood that groups Alma with the clear cases
should also group Bob with those cases, but there will be admissible ways of splitting up
the indeterminate cases that group Bob with the clear cases but not Alma.
For the case of adulthood, there are only finitely many ways of splitting up the set of
indeterminate cases (there are only finitely many people). A fortiori, there will be only
finitelymany completions. Then one can say that the degree of adulthood of a given person
equals the proportion of completions that group that person with the clear instances.
Trivially, every clear instance will on this definition receive a degree of adulthood of 1
and every clear non-instance will receive a degree of adulthood of 0. More interestingly,
if Alma is grouped with the clear instances by, say, 60 percent of the completions, then
her degree of adulthood equals .6, and if Bob is grouped with the clear instances by 80
percent of the completions, then his degree of adulthood equals .8.
This is the fundamental idea behind Kamp and Partee’s definition of graded mem-
bership. The definition itself is slightly complicated by the fact that some predicates
will have infinitely many associated completions. Therefore, the definition equates the
degree of 𝑃membership of 𝑎 not with the proportion of completions that group 𝑎 with
the clear 𝑃 cases but rather with the (normed)measure of those completions (in the sense
of measure theory; see Halmos, 1974). Kamp and Partee further argue for imposing a
number of formal constraints on this measure. These constraints are meant to ensure that
the measure is well-behaved in certain ways, such as that it assigns values in the [0, 1]
interval and that it is additive.
As stated in the introduction, however, Kamp and Partee acknowledge that this still
does not yield a unique graded membership function. In their words,
the constraints do not determine the function 𝜇 [i.e., the graded membership func-
tion] completely. Indeed, it is far from clear on what sorts of criteria a particular 𝜇
could or should be selected. (Kamp and Partee, 1995, p. 153)
Given the role that graded membership was supposed to play in their semantics, the
noted shortcoming implies that the semantics still leaves wide open the truth values of
many sentences in the language.
Decock and Douven (2014) argue that the elements of the above proposal all have
natural interpretations in the context of a version of the conceptual spaces approach, and
that, given those interpretations, the additional constraints to secure uniqueness of the
graded membership function flow directly from the geometry of conceptual spaces. A
conceptual space is a one- or multidimensional metric space whose dimension or dimen-
sions represent fundamental qualities that items may have and whose associated metric
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is used to measure similarities between items in the respect represented by the space.
Concepts, in this view, are regions in a conceptual space. For example, color space can be
thought of as a three-dimensional Euclidean space with one dimension representing hue,
one dimension representing brightness, and one dimension representing saturation, and
with the Euclidean metric defined on it measuring the color similarity between items.
Color concepts are regions in this space. (For details on color space, see below.)
Before expanding on Decock and Douven’s account, it is worth briefly elaborating
on the provenance of conceptual spaces. The structure of a conceptual space is typically
determined on the basis of similarity ratings. These ratings are given as input to one of
several related statistical techniques that turn similarities, or more usually distances, into
geometric objects. Most of these techniques go under the name of “multidimensional
scaling.” However, other techniques have been used as well; see, for instance, Castro, Ra-
manathan, and Chennubhotla (2013), who use nonnegative matrix factorization instead
of multidimensional scaling to chart the structure of olfactory space. (See Clark, 1993,
Appendix, and Gärdenfors, 2000, pp. 21–30, for more on this.)
The version of the conceptual spaces approach that Decock and Douven assume
builds on an earlier version presented in Gärdenfors (2000, Chs. 3 and 4), which combines
conceptual spaces with prototype theory and the technique of Voronoi tessellations. A
Voronoi tessellation of a given space is a division of that space into non-overlapping
cells such that each cell has a center and contains all and only those points in the space
that lie no closer to the center of any other cell than to its own center. Points that lie
equally close to two or more centers constitute the boundary lines. Formally, where 𝑆 is
an𝑚-dimensional space, 𝛿 a metric defined on that space, and ⟨𝑝1,… , 𝑝𝑛⟩ a sequence
of pairwise distinct points in 𝑆, the region
𝑣(𝑝𝑖) ≔ {𝑝 | 𝛿(𝑝, 𝑝𝑖) ⩽ 𝛿(𝑝, 𝑝𝑗), for all 𝑗 ∈ {1,… , 𝑛} with 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖}
is the Voronoi polygon/polyhedron associated with 𝑝𝑖. The elements of {𝑣(𝑝𝑖)}1⩽𝑖⩽𝑛 jointly
constitute the Voronoi diagram generated by ⟨𝑝1,… , 𝑝𝑛⟩ (see Okabe, Boots, Sugihara &
Chiu, 2000, Ch. 2, for details). The left panel of Figure 2.1 shows a Voronoi tessellation
on a two-dimensional Euclidean space, illustrating the above definition.
As Gärdenfors (2000, Ch. 3) argues, if the points representing prototypes in a given
space are taken as the centers of a Voronoi tessellation, this tessellation carves up the
space into cells which can be interpreted as concepts and, so interpreted, have various
psychologically plausible properties. For instance, when a space is divided on this basis,
the resulting cells are all convex (in the topological sense of the word; see Okabe et al.,
2000, p. 58, for a proof). This is in line with empirical findings that suggest that concepts
indeed correspond to convex regions (see, e.g., Sivik & Taft, 1994).
Decock and Douven take on board the amendment of Gärdenfors’ version of the
conceptual spaces approach that had been proposed in Douven, Decock, Dietz, and Égré
(2013). In Gärdenfors’ version, it is assumed that there is a unique prototype for each
concept. However, at least if prototypes are understood in the sense of most representative
instances, then in general that assumption can at best be an idealization. Surely there is
not exactly one shade of red that best represents the concept of redness. It is therefore
more realistic to say that instead of one prototypical point for red, we find in color space
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Figure 2.1: The left panel shows one of the “simple” Voronoi tessellations that make up
the collated Voronoi tessellation shown in the right panel.
a prototypical region for red: a region of points that can all lay equal claim to being
“maximally representative” for red (see in the same vein Regier, Kay, and Cook, 2005,
p. 8390). But admitting as much requires a rethinking of the technique of Voronoi
tessellations, given that, in standard definitions, such tessellations are generated by sets
of points (the centers), not by sets of regions. To overcome this limitation, Douven et
al. (2013) introduce (what they call) collated Voronoi tessellations, which are basically—as
the name suggests—collations of ordinary Voronoi tessellations. More precisely, a collated
Voronoi tessellation on a space overlays one over the other all ordinary tessellations on
that space generated by a sequence of points which has as components one point from
each prototypical region in the space.
Douven et al. (2013) show that the cells of a collated Voronoi tessellation still have
the property of being convex, which is desirable if we interpret these cells as representing
concepts (for the reason mentioned previously). Douven and colleagues also prove that,
on the assumption that each prototypical region in a space is connected (again in the
topological sense of the word), the boundary region of the corresponding collatedVoronoi
tessellation is “gapless.” Psychologically speaking, the most important new feature of
collated Voronoi tessellations is that their boundary regions have a certain “thickness,” as
the right panel of Figure 2.1 illustrates for a two-dimensional collatedVoronoi diagram. To
see why this is a desirable feature, note that we have no diﬃculty imagining a blue–green
borderline case such that slightly altering its color along any of the three dimensions of
color space will again result in a blue–green borderline case. So, speaking intuitively, a
borderline case can be completely “surrounded” by other borderline cases. (Note that
the preceding statement says “can,” not “must”: borderline cases on the edges are not
completely surrounded by other borderline cases.) This fact is not adequately accounted
for by Gärdenfors’ version of the conceptual spaces framework, in which borderlines are
all no more than one point “thick,” whence “almost all” points neighboring a borderline
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point (i.e., a point representing a borderline case) are not themselves borderline points
but belong determinately to one or the other concept.
While it is an open issue how broadly applicable the conceptual spaces approach is,
it has been quite generally accepted as a framework for modeling perceptual concepts,
like color concepts (e.g., Helm, 1964; Shepard, 1964; Shepard & Carroll, 1966; Indow,
1988; Paramei, Izmailov, & Sokolov, 1991; Shepard & Cooper, 1992; Bosten, Robinson,
Jordan & Mollon, 2005; Borg & Groenen, 2010, Ch. 4), auditory concepts (Petitot, 1989;
Wang, Green, Samal & Yunusova, 2013), olfactory concepts (Castro, Ramanathan, &
Chennubhotla, 2013), and shape concepts (Gärdenfors, 2000; Churchland, 2012). It
has further been applied to action concepts (Gärdenfors, 2007; Gärdenfors &Warglien,
2012), event concepts (Gärdenfors &Warglien, 2012), moral concepts (Oddie, 2005), and
scientific concepts like mass and acceleration (Gärdenfors & Zenker, 2011, 2013). Even if
the conceptual spaces approach were limited to the aforementioned types of concepts,
that would still make it suﬃciently general to be of considerable interest.1 The same
would hold true for the conceptual spaces version of Kamp and Partee’s account of graded
membership summarized above. In the following, we set out to test this approach in the
context of color concepts.
3 Overall design
In this paper, we oﬀer an empirical test of the conceptual spaces version of Kamp and
Partee’s account of graded membership. In this account, the geometrical structure of a
space—its dimensions and metric—in conjunction with the locations of the prototypical
regions in that space determine uniquely, for any item and any concept representable in
the space, the degree to which the item falls under the concept. As Decock and Douven
(2014) show, if the geometrical structure of a space is known and if we also know where
the prototypical regions in that space lie, we can eﬀectively compute the degree to which
a given item is a member of a given concept in the space. Thus, given a space for which
such computations can be carried out, Kamp and Partee’s account is testable if we can
elicit people’s judgments about the degrees to which items fall under various concepts in
that space.
To make this more concrete, let (i) the geometry of color space be given, and sup-
pose (ii) it were known where in this space are the prototypical regions for the colors
corresponding to Berlin and Kay’s (1969) basic color terms.2 From this information,
the present version of Kamp and Partee’s account of graded membership permits one
to predict, for any given shade, the degree to which people would judge it to belong to
1It is also sometimes said that the conceptual spaces approach, and geometric models of similarity
generally, face the objection that similarity judgments can be asymmetric, as shown by Tversky (1977).
See Gärdenfors (2000, p. 112 ﬀ) for a response to this objection; see also Decock and Douven (2011).
Independently, we note that, to the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence to support the claim that
color similarity judgments can be asymmetric. So, even if geometric models of similarity were not tenable
generally, there is no reason to doubt the geometric model of color similarity that will play an important role
in the following (and that is widely used in color research).
2See Cook, Kay, and Regier (2005) for more recent data on basic color terms.
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Figure 3.1: Diﬀerent viewpoints of the set of 1625 chips from the Munsell laboratory
placed in CIELUV space.
the various basic colors. It should be straightforward to compare such predictions with
experimentally obtained color judgments, which would amount to a test of the designated
account of graded membership.
As to (i), it is to be noted that color scientists regard diﬀerent color spaces as ap-
propriate for diﬀerent viewing conditions. Specifically, the Commission Internationale
de l’Éclairage has recommended the use of CIE 1976 𝐿*𝑢*𝑣* space (or CIELUV space)
for the characterization of colored displays on television or computer screens, and the
use of the geometrically very similar CIE 1976 𝐿*𝑎*𝑏* space (or CIELAB space) for the
characterization of paints and colored surfaces (Malacara, 2002, pp. 86–90). The CIELUV
and CIELAB spaces are designed to be perceptually uniform in the sense that pairs of
color stimuli that human observers tend to perceive as equally diﬀerent are mapped to
pairs of points at equal distance in the space. While most color researchers consider them
to be relatively close approximations of phenomenal color space, it is generally recognized
that neither space is perfect in this respect (Fairchild, 2013, Ch. 10).
Because our experiments were conducted online, we will be working mostly in
CIELUV space. For obvious reasons, online experiments are limited to stimuli that
have RGB coordinates. Such stimuli are representable in CIELUV space but they can
only cover part of it. Giving an impression of the RGB-representable part of CIELUV
space, Figure 3.1 shows the locations in that part of a set of 1625 Munsell chips available
from the website of the Munsell laboratory at the Rochester Institute of Technology
(http://www.rit.edu/cos/colorscience/rc_munsell_renotation.php).
As to (ii), information on the locations in color space of prototypical color regions is
limited. Berlin and Kay (1969), Sturges and Whitfield (1995), Benavente, Vanrell, and
Baldrich (2006), and others report data on prototypicality judgments made by informants,
but these data do not allow us to estimate the locations of prototypical color regions
precisely enough for the purposes of our study.
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The empirical work we undertook consisted of two main parts. The first—addressing
the aforementioned point concerning (ii)—aimed to determine, or at least approximate,
the locations in CIELUV space of the prototypical regions for two color categories, blue
and green, and the second aimed to elicit degrees of blueness (or greenness) of various
color shades in the blue–green region. From the results of the first part, Kamp and Partee’s
account of graded membership allowed us to calculate the degrees of blueness of the
color shades used in the second part, which could then be compared with results from
the second part in order to assess the predictive accuracy of Kamp and Partee’s account.
Specifically, we conducted three experiments: Experiment 1 is a first step toward
estimating the locations of the blue and green prototypical regions in CIELUV space.
The first part of Experiment 2 takes the results of Experiment 1 as a starting point, with
the aim of arriving at more accurate estimates of those prototypical regions. The second
part of Experiment 2 elicits judgments to determine degrees of blueness (or greenness) of
diﬀerent color patches in three diﬀerent series, ranging from blue to green. Experiment 3
controls for the possibility that the degrees of membership obtained in Experiment 2
might be biased by the specific protocol of the task, and uses diﬀerent methods to elicit
degrees of membership.
The three color series we used in Experiments 2 and 3 consisted of fourteen patches
each. Although all three series go in a straight line (straight in CIELUV space, that is)
from a determinately blue patch to a determinately green patch, the series were chosen so
that two are relatively close to each other in CIELUV space—having the same direction,
each at a constant brightness, with almost identical distances between patches in CIELUV
space—and one has a diﬀerent direction, ranges across diﬀerent levels of brightness, and
features a greater distance between the patches in CIELUV space than the first two series.
This was done on purpose, to allow a precise assessment of the predictive accuracy of
Kamp and Partee’s account of graded membership. For the account to be accurate at least
to a minimal degree, its predictions for the various degrees of blueness of the patches in
the third series should at least match the judgments about those patches more closely
than the judgments about the patches in the other series. But will Kamp and Partee’s
account (also) be able to discriminate between the two less well separated series? The
predicted degrees for these series will inevitably be relatively close to each other, and it is
reasonable to expect the same to hold for the observed degrees. Whether the predicted
degrees for one of the two “close” series better match the observed degrees for that series
than they match the observed degrees for the other thus constitutes a severe test for Kamp
and Partee’s account.
The methodology of our test of Kamp and Partee’s account has some limitations,
which are worth stating explicitly. First, Kamp and Partee oﬀer what is meant to be a
generally applicable semantics for languages with vague predicates. Our test is restricted
to precisely two vague predicates, “blue” and “green.” So, even if it passes our test, that
still only gives some support to Kamp and Partee’s semantics. But it may be support
enough to warrant conducting further experimental studies, whether along the lines of
the present one or otherwise. Moreover, the semantics may fail our test. That would show
it to be materially inadequate, which would be an important (if perhaps undesirable)
result.
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Second, we conducted online experiments to test Kamp and Partee’s semantics in
the domain of color. Crowdsourcing services make it easy and relatively cheap for
researchers to gather vast amounts of data. This explains the increasing popularity of this
methodology in psychology and the social sciences. But while the methodology as such
is not contested, one may have concerns over its use for perception studies. Traditionally,
such studies have been conducted under standardized viewing conditions, mostly in
laboratory environments. Internet-based experiments give the researcher no control over
viewing conditions, and diﬀerences in those conditions due to participants’ use of diﬀerent
monitors, operating systems, or web browsers are only to be expected. Such diﬀerences
may seem especially troublesome for color experiments, where viewing conditions may
matter even more than in experiments on, for instance, shape recognition. Still, in recent
years a number of researchers have investigated the question of the validity of online color
experiments by seeking to replicate in online studies the results of experiments that had
been conducted in a controlled laboratory setting, and these replication attempts were
generally successful; see in particular Moroney (2003), Sprow, Barańczuk, Stamm, and
Zolliker (2009), Mylonas andMacDonald (2010), andMylonas, Paramei, andMacDonald
(2014). That being said, we would very much welcome a rerun of our experiments in the
setting of a specialized laboratory.
Third, color similarity judgments are known to vary somewhat, both across people
and across contexts of categorization. Hence, CIELUV space can at best capture the
“average” person’s perceptual color space in the “average” context of categorization.3
Similarly, it is known that people can disagree about which shades are the most represen-
tative for a given color category. Ideally, then, one would want to proceed as follows: First
predict, for each individual participant separately, and for each categorization context
one is interested in, degrees of color membership of a range of color data on the basis of
(i) a color space representing that participant’s color similarity judgments in the given
context, and (ii) the regions in that space containing the shades deemed prototypical
for the various colors by the same participant given the same context. Next determine
the degrees to which the color data belong to the various color categories, in the partici-
pant’s judgment, and separately for the categorization contexts of interest. And finally,
compare the thus obtained predicted and observed degrees of membership. While not
practically impossible, the procedure outlined here would obviously require an enormous
expenditure of time and eﬀort, and probably also substantial financial resources. It is
hardly prudent to follow this procedure in the absence of any empirical support for Kamp
and Partee’s semantics. This being so, it is best to start, less ambitiously, with somewhat
simpler studies, such as the ones we are presenting, which in a way average not only over
personal and contextualized perceptual spaces but also over judgments of typicality and
judgments of graded membership.
3As mentioned, CIELUV space is taken to model color similarity judgments in contexts in which the
stimuli are presented on a screen. There is evidence that diﬀerences in categorization task can lead to further
systematic diﬀerences in similarity judgments (see, e.g., Nosofsky, 1987).
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4 Experiment 1
To estimate the locations of the prototypical blue and green regions in CIELUV space, we
proceeded in two stages. Experiment 1 constitutes the first stage, which was aimed at
obtaining a first approximation of these locations.
4.1 Method
Participants
The total number of participants was 286. They had been recruited via the crowdsourc-
ing interface CrowdFlower (http://www.crowdflower.com), which directed them to
the Qualtrics platform (http://www.qualtrics.com) through which the survey was
administered. In return for their cooperation, they were paid a small amount of money.
All participants were from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, or the United States.
Repeat participation was prevented.
We removed data from 2 participants who submitted incomplete surveys, 4 partic-
ipants who indicated that they were colorblind, and 28 participants who failed a color
sorting task that served as a quality control question, resulting in a sample of 252. The
average age of these participants was 30 (SD = 11); 52 percent of them were female; 80
percent indicated university as their highest education level and 19 percent high school;
the remaining participants had a lower education level. The participants included in the
analysis spent on average 10 minutes on the survey (SD = 13m).
The survey was in English (as were the surveys used in Experiments 2 and 3), but
because this experiment only aimed at obtaining a rough estimate of the prototypical
blue and green regions, we did not ask participants for their native language, nor did
we exclude the fastest and slowest 5 percent responders (a common procedure in online
experiments to enhance data quality). In the other experiments, where precisionmattered
more, nonnative speakers of English and fastest and slowest responders were excluded.
Materials and procedure
The materials of the present experiment consisted of 3 × 27 = 81 PNG images of
(2 × 256)2 = 512 × 512 pixels each (2562 colors, 4 pixels per color). All images were
cross-sections of RGB space with, for each of the R, G, and B axes, 27 equally spaced
cross-sections normal to the axis. The images were produced by means of a homemade
program, written in Object Pascal. By way of illustration, Figure 4.1 shows the middle
(the fourteenth) image of each series.
In one part of the experiment, each participant was presented with a random selection
of 25 of the 81 images, which were shown one after the other, each on a separate screen.
Participants were asked to indicate, for each image they were shown, which spot in the
image (if any) they considered to be typically blue; they were asked to indicate this by
clicking on that spot in the image. The other part of the experiment was exactly the same,
again using 25 randomly selected images, except that now the participants were asked
to indicate which spot in each image (if any) they deemed typically green. Whether a
participant received first the blue part and then the green part or the other way around
was randomized per participant.
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Figure 4.1: The middle images of the series of 27 cross-sections of RGB space along the R
axis (left), the G axis (middle), and the B axis (right).
4.2 Results
In all, there were 4037 clicks indicating typically blue shades and 3741 clicks indicating
typically green shades. The former are shown in CIELUV space in the upper left panel of
Figure 4.2, the latter in the upper right panel. As is apparent from the figure, both for
green and even more for blue, there were clicks on shades that probably anyone would
agree are clearly not green or blue, respectively. For example, in response to the question
concerning typical blue, some participants clicked on purple, red, or yellow shades.
This will be partly noise, caused by participants clicking inadvertently (the Qualtrics
software does not oﬀer the opportunity to undo such errors) or by their not taking the
task suﬃciently seriously. On the other hand, it is also to be recognized that each image
creates a context, in which for example even a purple shade may be judged to be typically
blue by some participants. This was precisely the reason why we sliced up RGB space
systematically along the three axes, so that we could average over all the clicks, thereby
filtering out context eﬀects as much as possible.
In averaging, we first calculated the medoids for both blue and green, where the
medoid of a set of points is the point that minimizes the average distance to all points
in the set (so, in the present case, the blue medoid is the “click” in the set of blue clicks
that has the least average CIELUV distance to the points in that set). We then selected
from the blue clicks the 50 percent that were closest (in CIELUV distances) to the blue
medoid, and similarly from the green clicks the 50 percent that were closest to the green
medoid. The lower left panel of Figure 4.2 shows the blue and green medoids, and the
lower right panel shows the clicks for each color that remained after the selection.
5 Experiment 2
The experiment consisted of two parts: one that built on the results from Experiment 1
and that aimed to locatemore precisely the green and blue prototypical regions in CIELUV
space, and one that aimed to measure the degrees of blueness/greenness of three series of
patches.
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Figure 4.2: CIELUV space with responses for typical blue (top left); responses for typical
green (top right); blue and green medoids (bottom left); 50 percent responses closest to
medoids (bottom right).
5.1 Method
Participants
There were 394 participants in the study. They were again recruited via CrowdFlower,
and the experiment was conducted on the Qualtrics platform. The participants received
a small amount of money in compensation for their time. All participants were from
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, or the United States. Repeat participation was
prevented.
We removed data from 8 participants who indicated that they were colorblind and
from 24 participants who indicated that they were nonnative speakers of English (the
language of the survey), as well as the fastest and slowest 5 percent of responders.4 We
further removed the data from the 31 participants who failed the same color sorting task
that had been used in Experiment 1 and from the one participant who indicated that
he or she had not responded seriously. (Following a suggestion by Aust, Diedenhofen,
Ullrich, ad Musch (2013), at the end of the survey the participants were asked whether
4We reran all analyses with fastest and slowest responders included and obtained qualitatively the same
results as the ones reported in Section 5.2.
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Figure 5.1: One of the four grids for blue (left) and one of the four grids for green (right).
they had responded seriously; it was emphasized that the answer to this question would
not aﬀect payment.) The final analysis was based on the responses of the remaining 290
participants.
These participants spent on average 390 seconds on the survey (SD = 120 s). Their
mean age was 38 (SD = 12). Of these participants, 58 percent were female; 70 percent
indicated university as their highest education level, 24 percent high school, and the
remaining 6 percent a lower education level. Participants included in the analysis did not
diﬀer significantly from excluded participants in age, gender, or level of education.
Materials
The materials for the first part of the experiment—the part concerned with locating the
prototypical regions—were 144 diﬀerent points in CIELUV space randomly sampled
from the 50 percent of clicks for blue that in Experiment 1 were nearest to the bluemedoid,
and 144 diﬀerent points in CIELUV space randomly sampled from the 50 percent of
clicks for green that in the same experiment were nearest to the green medoid. Each set
of 144 points was divided into four subsets, and each subset was used to create a 6 × 6
grid of uniformly colored circles, where each circle had the color of one unique element
of the subset. The circles were arranged against a uniformly gray background with RGB
coordinates ⟨124, 124, 124⟩. Figure 5.1 shows one of the four grids for blue and one of
the four grids for green. (The specific number of 144 was motivated strictly by practical
concerns: it allowed us to create, for both blue and green, four grids of circular color
patches such that the patches still appeared at a reasonable size on a computer screen.)
The materials for the second part of the experiment—the part concerned with elicit-
ing degrees of blueness/greenness—consisted of three series of fourteen color patches
each, all starting with a determinately blue patch and gradually transitioning to a de-
terminately green patch. The series—simply referred to as “Series 1,” “Series 2,” and
“Series 3” in the following—are shown in Figure 5.2. (For purposes of reporting the
experimental results, throughout we assume the patches in each series to be numbered
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Series 2
Series 3
Figure 5.2: The three series that served as part of the materials.
1 through 14, from left to right as the series appear in Figure 5.2.) Series 1 goes from
⟨31.9, −15.5, −92.1⟩ to ⟨31.7, −27.9, 31.0⟩ in CIELUV coordinates (from ⟨19, 62, 198⟩ to
⟨18, 87, 1⟩ in RGB coordinates), with a CIELUV distance (Δ𝐸*) of 9.5 between each
pair of adjacent patches. Series 2 goes from ⟨25.0, −10.6, −87.9⟩ to ⟨24.7, −20.8, 14.6⟩
(from ⟨13, 36, 188⟩ to ⟨12, 68, 36⟩ in RGB space), with a separation of Δ𝐸* = 7.9 between
adjacent patches. Finally, Series 3 goes from ⟨29.6, −11.5, −122.0⟩ to ⟨87.8, −84.9, 87.2⟩,
with a separation of Δ𝐸* = 17.6. In RGB space, Series 3 in eﬀect goes from the “pure blue”
point in that space, ⟨0, 0, 255⟩ to the “pure green” point in that space, ⟨0, 255, 0⟩.
Figure 5.3 depicts the three series in CIELUV space. Note that while each of the series
goes in a straight line from the blue region to the green region, Series 3 is quite diﬀerent
from the other two, both in direction and in span. By contrast, Series 1 and 2 are rather
close to each other, having the same direction and a comparable span.
L*
u*
v*
u* L*
v*
Figure 5.3: Diﬀerent viewpoints of CIELUV space with Series 1–3 highlighted. The
series with the greatest span is Series 3. Series 2 has the shortest span; it appears as the
“uppermost” series in the left panel and as the “rightmost” series in the right panel.
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Procedure
In the first part of the experiment, participants were shown the eight grids, one after the
other, in an order randomized per participant, and participants were asked for each grid
to click on the disk that struck them as being most typical for blue, respectively green.
Participants were told that they could click on more than one disk, but that only their last
click would be registered. They were also asked to take their time to consider alternative
options before they continued to the next screen.
In the second part of the experiment, each participant was presented with two of
Series 1–3, where the two series were chosen randomly per participant. Each chip of
the chosen series was shown separately, in an individually randomized order, and the
participants were asked to classify (by clicking one of two radio buttons) the color of each
chip as either blue or green. It was explicitly noted at the beginning of this part of the
experiment, and repeated on each screen, that the color shown might not fall clearly into
either the green or the blue category, and participants were asked to choose the option
that, in their opinion, best described the shown color.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Determining predicted and observed degrees of membership
In the first part of the experiment, all participants clicked on each of the eight screens,
yielding a total of 1160 judgments for typical blue and an equal number of judgments
for typical green. This implies that the mean number of clicks received by the disks is
1160/144 ≈ 8 (SDblue = 11; SDgreen = 17). The maximum number of clicks received by a
blue disk was 66; the maximum number of clicks received by a green disk was 116.
There is no obvious cutoﬀ point in terms of number or percentage of clicks for
counting a disk to exhibit a typical shade of blue, respectively green. Therefore, we chose
to use various cutoﬀ points, hoping that all choices would lead to qualitatively similar
conclusions. Specifically, we decided to estimate the locations of the typical blue and
typical green regions on the basis of (i) all 144 points in CIELUV space that had been
sampled for each color in Experiment 1; (ii) the points with numbers of clicks greater
than or equal to the first quartile; (iii) the points with numbers of clicks greater than or
equal to the median number of clicks (second quartile); and (iv) the points with numbers
of clicks greater than or equal to the third quartile.
To explain how we calculated degrees of membership for the colors in Series 1–3, we
first recall that, on the conceptual version of Kamp and Partee’s semantics, the degree to
which an item belongs to a category is given by themeasure of simple Voronoi tessellations
that group that item with the category’s prototypical region. In the present case, there
are infinitely many such tessellations to be considered, given that the prototypical blue
and prototypical green regions contain infinitely many points (whichever of the above
choices we make). It is computationally impossible to consider all of these. However, we
can approximate degrees of membership by randomly sampling from the simple Voronoi
tessellations and determining degrees of membership on the basis of the resulting sample.
This is how we proceeded.
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Figure 5.4: CIELUV space with Series 1–3 and prototypical regions for blue and green
estimated on the basis of all 2 × 144 points selected in Experiment 1 (top left); 75 percent
highest-rated points (top right); 50 percent highest-rated points (bottom left); 25 percent
highest-rated points (bottom right).
In particular, we started by calculating the convex hulls for the sets of points resulting
from the choices (i)–(iv); Figure 5.4 shows the convex hulls for these diﬀerent choices
together with Series 1–3. Next, for each of those choices, we sampled 1,000 points
from the blue convex hull and 1,000 points from the green convex hull, and we used all
1,000,000 pairs of points ⟨𝑝b, 𝑝g⟩ with 𝑝b coming from the prototypical blue region and
𝑝g coming from the prototypical green region to generate simple Voronoi tessellations
on CIELUV space. Note that, because each of these tessellations is generated by two
points, it divides CIELUV space into two cells. By the definition of a simple Voronoi
tessellation, these cells are separated from each other by the perpendicular bisector plane
of the line segment connecting the two generating points. For points 𝑝1 = (𝑝11, 𝑝12, 𝑝13)
and 𝑝2 = (𝑝21, 𝑝22, 𝑝23), this perpendicular bisector plane is given by the equation
(𝑝11 − 𝑝21)𝑥 + (𝑝12 − 𝑝22)𝑦 + (𝑝13 − 𝑝23)𝑧 =
1
2
⟨𝑝11 + 𝑝21, 𝑝12 + 𝑝22, 𝑝13 + 𝑝23⟩ ⋅ ⟨𝑝11 − 𝑝21, 𝑝12 − 𝑝22, 𝑝13 − 𝑝23⟩.
One readily verifies that every point in this plane—every point (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) that satisfies the
above equation—is equidistant from 𝑝1 and 𝑝2.
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Figure 5.5: Each row shows a diﬀerent simple Voronoi tessellation on CIELUV space
generated by two points randomly chosen from the prototypical blue and prototypical
green regions. The pairs of generating points appear bigger than the points representing
the series. The blue–green boundary of each tessellation appears as a gray plane.
Figure 5.5 shows two of the 1,000,000 diﬀerent simple Voronoi tessellations that were
generated in this process. It can be seen that, while the tessellation shown in the top row
groups patches 1 through 10 of Series 1 with the pick from the blue prototypical region,
the tessellation shown in the bottom row groups patches 1 through 11 of Series 1 with
that pick. Similarly, the first tessellation groups the first 12 patches of Series 2 and the
first 7 patches of Series 3 with the pick from the prototypical blue region while the second
groups the first 11 patches of Series 2 and the first 8 patches of Series 3 with the same
pick.
The final step, then, consisted of counting, for each of the 42 patches, how many of
the 1,000,000 simple Voronoi tessellations grouped it with the pick from the prototypical
blue region.5 Dividing the resulting numbers by 1,000,000 yielded degrees of blueness;
degree of greenness was set equal to 1 minus degree of blueness. The top row of Figure 5.6
shows the results of the calculations.
It is obvious from these graphs that the choice of the cutoﬀ point in the first part of
the experiment hardly makes a diﬀerence, and so it is not surprising that we find perfect
correlations between degrees of membership for the same series with diﬀerent cutoﬀ
points for typicality. There are also strong correlations (𝑟 ⩾ .89) between the degrees for
5Practically speaking, this amounted to determining for each of the patches whether it was closer to the
pick from the prototypical blue region or to the pick from the prototypical green region.
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Figure 5.6: Top row: Predicted degrees of blueness for the patches in Series 1–3, assum-
ing diﬀerent cutoﬀ points for typicality; Q𝑖 gives the degrees of blueness assuming as
prototypical regions the convex hulls of the points with numbers of clicks greater than
or equal to the 𝑖-th quantile. Middle row: Observed degrees of blueness. Bottom row:
Predicted (All) versus observed degrees of blueness.
Series 1 and 2, and lower correlations (.58 ⩽ 𝑟 ⩽ .78) between the degrees for either of
the first two series and Series 3.
To test Kamp and Partee’s account of graded membership, on which the predictions
shown in the top row of Figure 5.6 are based, we must confront these predicted degrees of
blueness of the various patches in Series 1–3 with the degrees of blueness of those patches
as perceived by the participants. In all comparisons of predicted and observed degrees of
blueness, we took into account predicted degrees based on each of the aforementioned
cutoﬀ points. Given that not only were the qualitative conclusions exactly the same
whichever cutoﬀ point was assumed, but even quantitative diﬀerences were negligible, we
report only analyses assuming predicted degrees as calculated on the basis of the largest
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convex hulls.6 (To allow readers to verify this, the Appendix gives the numerical values
of the calculated degrees of membership for all four cutoﬀ points.)
Measuring perceived degrees of blueness was the purpose of the second part of
the present experiment. To determine these degrees, we interpreted the proportion
of participants who judged a chip to be blue as the degree of blueness of the chip. In
doing so, we loosely followed a suggestion made by Hampton (2007, p. 361) in the
context of his own work on vagueness and graded membership.7 The suggestion is that
the degree to which an item 𝑎 is a member of a set 𝑆 equals the probability that 𝑎 is
classified as belonging to 𝑆, where this probability is operationalized in terms of the
proportion of people who in fact classify the item as belonging to 𝑆. We say that our
operationalization of degree of membership is loosely based on this suggestion because
Hampton considered data obtained from asking whether a given item did or did not
belong to a given category. Rather than asking the participants whether or not a color
belonged to the blue category, we asked whether it belonged to the green or to the blue
category. (More on this methodological issue below.) Themiddle row of Figure 5.6 shows
the proportions-as-degrees for all chips.
5.2.2 Comparing predicted and observed degrees of membership
For a first comparison with predicted degrees, the bottom row of Figure 5.6 plots the
observed degrees together with the predicted degrees. We see that there is a very good
match between the predictions and the observations for Series 1 as well as a reasonably
goodmatch between the predictions and the observations for Series 2. Thematch between
the predictions and observations for Series 3 is not quite as good. What can already be
seen from the figure, however, is that, in a clear sense, the predictions for a given series
match the observations for that series better than they match the observations for either
of the other two series. Notice in particular that that, both for the predictions and
for the observations, the Point of Subjective Experience (PSE; here, the patch number
corresponding to 50 percent agreement) for Series 1 is to the left of the PSE for Series 2
and to the right of the PSE for Series 3.
To go beyond a mere visual inspection of the data, we fitted logistic curves to both
the observed and the predicted degrees for each series, then determined the PSE for each
of those curves, and finally calculated the slope of each curve at its PSE. More specifically,
for each data series we fitted a logistic curve by estimating values for three parameters in
𝑦 =
𝜑1
1 + exp[−(𝑥 − 𝜑2)/𝜑3]
;
6Note that it would be a mistake to think that, given that all cutoﬀ points give basically the same results,
we might as well have calculated degrees of membership on the basis of prototypical points for blue and
green. In that case, the collated Voronoi tessellation would be degenerate in that it would really be just a
simple Voronoi tessellation. That would mean that the borderline between blue and green is just a plane,
which in turn would mean that the graded membership function for blue is a step function, assigning a
degree of blueness of 1 to any shade lying on the side of the blue prototype and a degree of blueness of 0 to
any shade lying on the other side.
7Actually, Hampton attributes the idea to Black (1937). Basically the same suggestion had also been made
by the French mathematician Borel in his work on the sorites paradox; see Égré and Barberousse (2014).
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Table 5.1: PSEs and slopes for logistic curves fitted to predicted and observed degrees of
blueness.
PSE Slope
Predicted Observed Predicted Observed
S1 10.16 (±0.04) 9.67 (±0.13) −0.46 (±0.01) −0.44 (±0.06)
S2 11.82 (±0.05) 10.79 (±0.13) −0.36 (±0.01) −0.45 (±0.06)
S3 7.38 (±0.02) 8.30 (±0.11) −1.02 (±0.03) −0.51 (±0.09)
we set 𝑦 = .5 for the resulting function, solving for 𝑥 to obtain the PSE for the given
series; and we calculated the first derivative of the function at the PSE, which gave us the
slope at that point.8
Table 5.1 gives the values of the PSEs and slopes for each series, with 95 percent
bootstrap CIs in brackets. For observations, these CIs are based on 1,000 resamplings
for each series, but—because of the computational costs of the simulations required to
calculate predictions—are based on only 10 resamplings for predictions per series; the
latter does not seem to bemuch of a limitation, given the very low variability in the results,
which in fact we had some reason to expect in light of our earlier finding that it made
virtually no diﬀerence which cutoﬀ point for typicality was chosen to calculate predicted
degrees.
The values in Table 5.1 buttress the claim that the predictions match observations
better within series than across series: for each series, the PSE for the predicted degrees
is closer to the PSE for the observations than it is to the PSE to either of the other series.
And while the slopes for the observations for Series 1 and 2 are basically the same (the
diﬀerence between them is less than 0.005), in contrast to the slopes for their predictions,
the slope for the observations for Series 3 is clearly steeper than the slopes for the other
two series, in accordance with the predictions. From the CIs, we can easily calculate that
these patterns hold reliably.
In a further comparison of predictions and observations, we calculated the sum of
squared deviations of the predictions for a given series from the degrees measured for
that series, which are given by the diagonal of Table 5.2. Because we were interested in the
specificity of our model, for each series we also looked at the sum of squared deviations
of the predictions for that series from the observed values for each of the other series,
which are also given in Table 5.2. For instance, the entry at the first row, third column,
indicates that the sum of squared deviations of the predictions for Series 1 from the
observations for Series 3 equals 0.93. More generally, it is seen that, without exception,
the predictions for any given series deviate less from the observations for that series
than from the observations for either of the other series, in accordance with the findings
reported above.
8We thank James Hampton and an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis. As for the details of
the analysis, we followed Pinheiro and Bates (2000, Ch. 8).
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Table 5.2: Sums of squared deviations of predicted from observed degrees of blueness.
Observed
S1 S2 S3
Predicted S1 0.08 0.12 0.93
S2 1.07 0.29 2.33
S3 1.49 2.56 0.38
5.3 Discussion
This experiment was set up in two parts, the first having the aim of estimating the locations
of the prototypical blue and prototypical green regions in CIELUV space—the regions
where the typical instances of blue and green are to be found—and the second having
the aim of measuring the degrees of blueness/greenness of the various patches in Series
1–3. From the data obtained in the first part in conjunction with the conceptual spaces
version of Kamp and Partee’s account of graded membership, we could calculate degrees
of blueness/greenness for those same patches, which were compared with the degrees of
membership attributed by participants.
We obtained very similar S-shaped patterns in the predictions as well as in the ob-
servations for all three series. Nevertheless, it was seen that the predictions for a given
series invariably fit the observations for that series better than they fit the observations
for the other series. It is particularly noteworthy that these findings hold even with
respect to Series 1 and 2, which lie very close to one another in CIELUV space. This is
evidence that Kamp and Partee’s account of graded membership is, or at least can be,
highly discriminating.
In addition to this, it is worth highlighting that Kamp and Partee’s account of graded
membership makes predictions about where in CIELUV space the boundary region
between blue and green is to be found, including about where our series of patches enter
that region and where they exit it. Specifically, it predicts that, viewed from the side of
the prototypical blue region, Series 3 enters the blue/green boundary region earlier than
either of the other two series, and Series 1 enters that boundary region a little earlier than
Series 2. It further predicts that Series 3 also exits the boundary region earlier than the
other two series, and Series 1 exits it a little earlier than Series 2. Figure 5.6 makes it easy
to see that all these predictions are borne out by the data.
Most importantly, we obtain all this—moderately good to very good matches be-
tween predicted and observed degrees of membership, as well as accurate qualitative
predictions concerning the blue/green boundary region—without having estimated any
free parameters. To the contrary, all predictions followed ultimately from a semantics the
development of which was mainly driven by linguistic and philosophical concerns. That
nevertheless the semantics is at least fairly successful in predicting the data obtained in
Experiment 2 points toward its correctness. Indeed, we are not aware of any psychological
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model of categorization that can presently oﬀer quite the same. See the general discussion
for more on this.
While, as we said, the semantics is fairly successful in predicting the data, we saw that
in particular the match between the predictions and the observations for Series 3 leaves
something to be desired. In this connection, it is worth recalling some of the limitations
of our studies which we acknowledged in Section 3. That our data were obtained via
online surveys rather than in a specialized color laboratory, and that we are assuming
CIELUV space, which is known to be not entirely satisfactory as a model of human color
perception—if indeed there can be one such model (see Hardin, 1999)—already implies
that our predictions can be at best good approximations of the data. In fact, with respect
to the color space we are assuming, it may be especially noteworthy that Series 3, for
which our predictions were not as good as for Series 1 and 2, has a span in CIELUV
space that is roughly twice that of the other series (229 versus 123 for Series 1 and 102 for
Series 2). Color scientists have suggested that color space may actually be only locally
Euclidean (Indow, 1988), which has led some to propose diﬀerent metrics for measuring
small and large distances in color space (Westland, Ripamonti, & Cheung, 2012, p. 68 ﬀ).9
This may make it more problematic to conceive—as we have been doing—of Series 3
as one series of equally spaced patches in Euclidean space than it is to conceive of the
other two series as such. It may also mean that our model needs some slight modification.
For instance, as the model stands, all simple Voronoi tessellations contribute equally
to degree of membership, in that the degree of membership of item 𝑖 in category 𝐶 is
given by the measure of simple Voronoi tessellations that group 𝑖 with the prototypical
𝐶 region. But one could consider weighting the individual tessellations diﬀerently, with
the weights being some function of the distances between the generating points.10 This
might require adding one or more parameters to the model. Whether this, or something
along these lines, would significantly improve model fit in the case at hand is a question
we relegate to future work. For now, we content ourselves with noting that even in its
present form, without any free parameters, Kamp and Partee’s semantics does, overall, at
least reasonably well in light of the data gathered in this experiment.
6 Experiment 3
In the second part of Experiment 2, we used a two-alternative forced choice task, follow-
ing a suggestion of Hampton’s. But there are other plausible procedures for measuring
the degrees of blueness/greenness for the 42 patches from Series 1–3. To make our con-
clusions as robust as possible, and to control for the possibility that the results obtained
in Experiment 2 might be a bias of the 2AFC task employed, we followed up with Experi-
ment 3 in which we measured degrees of membership in a number of diﬀerent ways. The
9Alternatively, one could consider making color similarity an exponentially decaying function of Eu-
clidean distance in CIELUV space; see, e.g., Nosofsky (1986, 1987), and Shepard (1986).
10We here mean the possibility of letting the individual tessellations weigh diﬀerently in the calculation of
degrees of membership. However, one could also consider weighting the generating points of the individual
tessellations diﬀerently; see Okabe et al. (2000, Ch. 3) for several ways of doing this.
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goal was to compare the outcomes from the diﬀerent procedures with one another as well
as—most importantly—with the predictions obtained from the first part of Experiment 2.
6.1 Method
Participants
There were 357 participants in this experiment, all from Australia, Canada, Great Britain,
or the United States. The participants were recruited and tested in the same way as in the
previous experiments. They received a small amount of money for their cooperation.
Excluded from the analysis were 6 participants who returned incomplete response
sets, 7 participants who indicated that they were colorblind, 21 nonnative speakers of
English (the language of the survey), and the fastest and slowest 5 percent of responders.11
This left us with 288 participants. Further excluded were 33 participants who failed the
same sorting task that had been used in the previous experiments and one participant
who answered in the negative the question of whether he or she had responded seriously,
leaving 254 participants for the final analysis.
These participants spent on average 450 seconds on the survey (SD = 140 s). Their
mean age was 39 (SD = 12). Fifty-nine percent of the participants were female. Sixty-eight
percent indicated university as their highest education level, 28 percent high school, and
the remaining 4 percent a lower education level. Participants included in the analysis did
not diﬀer significantly from excluded participants in age, gender, or level of education.
Materials and procedure
The participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups. All four groups were
asked to judge the blueness/greenness of all patches in Series 1–3, though for each
series, the questions were diﬀerent, and which series went with which type of questions
diﬀered per group. Specifically, we used four types of questions for eliciting degrees
of blueness/greenness. Type I was a repetition of the 2AFC task used in the previous
experiment; so, participants were given the options “Blue” and “Green” and asked to
select the option that described the shown color best. In Type II, participants could move
a slider between 0 and 100, where 0 was labeled “Green” and 100 was labeled “Blue”; they
were asked where, on the line between “Green” and “Blue,” they would locate the color
that was shown. In Type III, participants were again given a slider task but were now
asked to indicate how blue they deemed the shown color patch, noting that 0 stood for
being clearly not blue and 100 for being clearly blue. Type IV was exactly like Type III
except that Type IV questions asked for how green the patch was instead of how blue.
As stated, each of the groups was shown all three series. Each chip was shown
individually on the screen. The order in which the series appeared was randomized per
participant, as was the order in which the patches in the series appeared. The first group
(𝑁 = 58) was shown Series 1 in combination with Type I questions (“blue or green”),
Series 2 in combination with Type II questions (“where between green and blue . . . ”),
and Series 3 in combination with Type III questions (“how blue . . . ”); the second group
11Here, too, all analyses were repeated with fastest and slowest responders included, and again this did
not lead to any qualitatively diﬀerent results.
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(𝑁 = 61) was shown Series 1 in combination with Type IV questions (“how green . . . ”),
Series 2 in combination with Type I questions, and Series 3 in combination with Type II
questions; the third group (𝑁 = 67) was shown Series 1 in combination with Type III
questions, Series 2 in combination with Type IV questions, and Series 3 in combination
with Type I questions; and finally the fourth group (𝑁 = 68) was shown Series 1 in
combination with Type II questions, Series 2 in combination with Type III questions, and
Series 3 in combination with Type IV questions.
6.2 Results
The top row of Figure 6.1 gives a graphical summary of the data, where data obtained by
means of Type I questions represent proportions of “Blue” responses and all other data
have been scaled by dividing them by 100; in addition, data obtained by means of Type IV
questions, which asked for degrees of greenness, have, for reasons of comparability, been
first divided by 100 and then subtracted from 1 (so we obtained degrees of blueness
from degrees of greenness). To facilitate comparison with the observed degrees from
Experiment 2, these are also plotted in the graphs in the top row of Figure 6.1; to facilitate
comparison with the predicted degrees, these are shown again in the bottom row.
It is readily seen that the degrees of blueness obtained via the questions of Types
II–IV all form somewhat flatter S-shapes than the degrees obtained via Type I questions
(including the degrees observed in the previous experiment). Visually, the former group
of measurements deviate more from the predicted degrees of blueness than the latter
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Figure 6.1: Observed (top row) and predicted (bottom row) degrees of blueness.
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Table 6.1: PSEs and slopes for logistic curves fitted to observed degrees of blueness as
measured in Experiment 3.
Type I Type II
PSE Slope PSE Slope
S1 9.72 (±0.20) −0.52 (±0.18) 10.76 (±0.21) −0.47 (±0.02)
S2 10.76 (±0.17) −0.47 (±0.23) 10.25 (±0.21) −0.10 (±0.02)
S3 8.06 (±0.16) −0.69 (±0.20) 8.12 (±0.19) −0.13 (±0.04)
Type III Type IV
PSE Slope PSE Slope
S1 8.98 (±0.20) −0.17 (±0.03) 9.87 (±0.19) −0.18 (±0.03)
S2 9.38 (±0.33) −0.11 (±0.02) 10.87 (±0.20) −0.12 (±0.04)
S3 7.35 (±0.25) −0.17 (±0.02) 9.10 (±0.38) −0.11 (±0.02)
group. This impression is confirmed by looking at the PSEs and slopes of the logistic
curves that were fitted to each series in the way described in Section 5.2.2 and which are
displayed in Table 6.1 (in brackets, bootstrap CIs based on 1,000 resamplings of the data).
It will be remembered that, for the predictions, the PSE for Series 1 was reliably
between those for Series 2 and 3, with the PSE for Series 3 being the lowest. We found the
exact same pattern in the observations from Experiment 2 and find it here as well, with
one exception: for the degrees obtained via the Type II questions, the PSE for Series 2 is
between the PSEs for the other two series. The slopes are rather unspecific here, which
was already obvious from Figure 6.1.
Here, too, we calculated sums of squared deviations of the predictions for a given
series from the observations for that series, which are given by the diagonal of Table 6.2.
For reasons explained earlier, the same table gives sums of squared deviations of the
predictions for a given series and the observations for the other series, showing that,
within any question type, predictions for a given series are closer to the observations for
that series than they are to the observations for either of the other series.
6.3 Discussion
The purpose of this experiment was to determine to what extent the outcomes of the
previous experiment depended on the particular method for measuring degrees of mem-
bership that was used in that experiment. In Experiment 2, we measured degrees of
blueness indirectly, by making participants choose between “Blue” and “Green” and then
equating degree of blueness with the proportion of participants who had chosen the
“Blue” option. In the present experiment, we also directly asked people to indicate degree
of blueness (greenness). We compared the degrees thus obtained with the predictions
based on the first part of Experiment 2.
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Table 6.2: Sums of squared deviations of predictions from observations.
Observed
Type I Type II
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Predicted S1 0.06 0.14 1.24 0.35 0.41 0.81
S2 1.08 0.35 2.74 0.88 0.49 1.81
S3 1.75 2.81 0.24 1.16 1.71 0.56
Observed
Type III Type IV
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Predicted S1 0.29 0.36 1.27 0.09 0.30 0.55
S2 1.15 0.81 2.50 0.63 0.20 1.13
S3 0.96 1.27 0.37 1.50 2.27 0.91
As in Experiment 2, we found that total squared deviations were smaller between pre-
dictions for a given series and observations for that series than between those predictions
and the observations for the other series. Similarly, we again found that almost without
exception the PSE for Series 1 lay between those for the other series, as predicted. These
findings attest further to the accuracy of the account of graded membership at issue.
On the other hand, the match between the predictions and the observations obtained
by directly asking for degrees of membership was less good than the match between the
same predictions and the observations obtained via the 2AFC task used in the previous
experiment and in the 2AFC task (the Type I questions) in the present experiment. This
diﬀerence in the results was unanticipated but is, we believe, not hard to explain.
First, there is a well-documented bias—the central tendency bias—that inclines
participants to avoid the endpoints of a response scale. According to Stevens (1971,
p. 428), this is “one of the most obstinate” response biases, which makes it reasonable
to believe that it contributed to the fact that, in the responses to the slider questions
(the Type II–IV questions), even those patches in Series 1–3 that one would expect to
have appeared clearly blue or clearly green to participants receive non-extreme degrees.
Obviously, the 2AFC tasks that we also used cannot have been aﬀected by this bias.
More importantly, there is a key respect in which measuring degrees of blueness via
the 2AFC task is exactly parallel to predicting degrees of blueness on the basis of the
prototypical blue and green regions. If the patches of Series 1–3 had been presented to
participants in a free naming task, then very probably next to blue and green responses
there would have been purple, turquoise, and possibly also gray responses; at any rate, it
is clear that there are patches for which “blue” or “green” are not necessarily the best or
only plausible labels. However, these were the only labels available to the participants in
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Experiment 2 as well as to the participants in the first group of Experiment 3. Now note
that it is also highly probable that, if we had been able to take into account information
about the locations in CIELUV space of the prototypical regions of purple and gray, that
would have influenced the outcomes of our predictions of degrees of blueness. In our
calculations of degrees of membership, each simple Voronoi tessellation classified a patch
either as blue or as green. If these calculations could have been based on knowledge of
the locations of additional prototypical regions, so that some simple Voronoi tessellations
might have classified a patch as purple or gray, some patches might have been predicted
to be purple to some degree, or gray to some degree. In other words, our predictions
were, in a way, also based on a 2AFC task.
Finally, in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, Type I group, where we used a 2AFC task,
one expects for a single participant (and not taking into account errors or inconsistencies
in the responses) the patches in a series to be judged blue until a certain patch, and green
afterwards. In other words, one essentially expects a step function. It is also reasonable
to expect the “switch point” to vary across participants, such that averaging over the
responses will yield an S-shaped curve—which is the result we obtained. By contrast, in
Experiment 3, Type II–IV groups, where we used a slider task, one expects for a single,
perfectly consistent participant an S-shaped response curve. Moreover, for Experiment
3, Type I group (which was presented the most neutral phrasing of the slider task), and
assuming an “ideal” participant, one would expect the PSE to occur between the same
patches as the switch point in the 2AFC task. Hence, averaging over the responses of
the slider tasks yields an S-shaped curve due to two factors: intra-participant (individual
graded response) and inter-participant (variation as before). In tandem, these factors
cause the slopes for the slider questions to be lower than the slopes of the S-curves
resulting from the 2AFC tasks—which is again what we find.12
7 General discussion
Linguists and logicians have expended much time and eﬀort on constructing formal
models of language. It is hard to overestimate the importance of this work for our
understanding of computer languages as well as the language of mathematics. But because
most of this work implicitly assumes predicates to be crisp, in that they either apply or
do not apply to any given item, formal semantics has improved our understanding only
for very limited fragments of natural languages, for it is a characteristic feature of such
languages that many of their predicates are vague and can apply to diﬀerent items in
diﬀering partial degrees.
Kamp and Partee have made important progress toward constructing a formal seman-
tics that can handle such vagueness of meaning.13 By their own admission, the account of
the graded membership relation that is at the heart of their semantics was still unfinished.
12Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us on this.
13As Kamp and Partee acknowledge in their 1995 paper, in constructing their semantics they could build
on important work in fuzzy logic (e.g., Zadeh, 1995). However, a crucial diﬀerence between their work and
the earlier work in fuzzy logic is that the latter took a notion of graded membership for granted whereas
Kamp and Partee aimed to define it.
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However, later work by other researchers showed how that account could be completed
in a natural way in the conceptual spaces framework that had been developed in the
cognitive sciences for purposes not primarily related to vagueness. The thus completed
semantics could also be shown to be formally correct in the sense that it does not give
rise to conflicting semantic assessments of one and the same sentence.
As mentioned in the introduction, formal correctness is one of two broadly accepted
desiderata for semantics, the other one being material adequacy. This paper reported
the results of a number of experiments conducted to test the material adequacy of Kamp
and Partee’s semantics in the conceptual spaces version. We obtained estimates of the
locations of the prototypical blue and prototypical green regions in CIELUV space, from
which, via Kamp and Partee’s account, degrees of blueness/greenness for various shades
in the blue–green region of color space could be derived. These were compared to the
second part of our results, which consisted of measurements of degrees of blueness.
The results of this comparison spoke rather unambiguously in favor of Kamp and
Partee’s account, in that the predictions were largely borne out by the observations.
The upshot of our experiments was not just that, overall, the predictions matched the
observations quite well, but also that Kamp and Partee’s account turned out to be highly
discriminative in that its predictions for Series 1 matched more closely the observations
for that series than the observations for the nearby Series 2 (nearby in CIELUV space,
that is), and vice versa.
As a formal semantics for languages with vague predicates, Kamp and Partee’s account
has few competitors. But there are psychological accounts of categorization that can
model vagueness and that could perhaps serve as a basis for a formal semantics. Therefore,
one might regard these accounts as being in competition with Kamp and Partee’s. To
bring further into relief the virtues of the latter account, we briefly compare it to two
prominent models of categorization that allow for vague categories, namely, Nosofsky’s
(1986, 1987, 1989) Generalized Context Model (GCM) and Hampton’s (2007) Threshold
Model (TM).14
Nosofsky’s model assumes exemplar theory rather than prototype theory and aims
to predict categorization probabilities rather than degrees of membership. Also, as
mentioned in note 9, Nosofsky assumes similarity to be measured by an exponential
decay function. But one can make the GCM at least to some extent comparable to Kamp
and Partee’s account by interpreting categorization probabilities as degrees ofmembership
and by agreeing tomeasure color similarity diﬀerently than is standardly done in CIELUV
space; for reasons given earlier in the paper, neither proposal would be unreasonable.
On the GCM, we learn a category by committing to memory all examples of the
category that we have come across so far. The probability that a newly encountered item is
included in the category then depends on how similar that item is to the stored exemplars.
In more detail, where we have two categories, 𝐶1 and 𝐶2, the probability that an item 𝑖 is
14See also Verheyen, Hampton, and Storms (2010), which presents the Rasch model (Rasch, 1960) as a
formalization of the TM.
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classified as belonging to 𝐶1 is given by
𝛽sim(𝑖, 𝐶1)
𝛽sim(𝑖, 𝐶1) + (1 − 𝛽)sim(𝑖, 𝐶2)
,
with 𝛽 (0 ⩽ 𝛽 ⩽ 1) representing the response bias for category 𝐶1. This equation has
the same form as Medin and Schaﬀer’s (1978) Context Model, but it is more general
than that because of the way sim(𝑖, 𝐶𝑛), the sum of the similarities of 𝑖 to the exemplars
of 𝐶𝑛 (𝑛 = 1, 2), is defined. Specifically, sim(𝑖, 𝐶𝑛) ≔ ∑𝑗(exp(−𝜆dist(𝑖, 𝑗)
𝑝), where 𝜆 is
the typicality gradient, which determines the steepness of the exponential decay; the
choice for 𝑝 depends on the discriminability of the stimuli (Shepard, 1986); and dist(𝑖, 𝑗)
is defined as (∑𝑚𝑘=1𝑤𝑘|𝑥𝑖𝑘 − 𝑥𝑗𝑘|
𝑟)1/𝑟 for an 𝑚-dimensional space. In the definition of
dist, the 𝑤𝑘’s take values in [0, 1] and add up to 1; 𝑤𝑘 is the attention weight given to
the 𝑘-th dimension of the space in computing the overall distance, and 𝑥𝑖𝑘 is item 𝑖’s
𝑘-coordinate in that space.
We could let the prototypical points sampled in Experiment 1 (or some subset thereof)
be proxy for exemplars and then try to find values for the parameters 𝛽, 𝜆, 𝑝, 𝑟, 𝑤1, 𝑤2,
and 𝑤3 that jointly minimize the sum of squared deviations of classification probabilities
frommeasured degrees of membership for the three series of color patches that figured in
our experiments, or which maximize the correlations between classification probabilities
and measured degrees of membership, or which strike the best balance between doing
both.15 Rather than tackle this optimization problem, we note that Kamp and Partee’s
account presents us with no such task. As was emphasized before, degrees of membership
flow directly from that account in conjunction with the structure of color space (including
the locations of prototypical regions), and so no model fitting is involved. That makes
Kamp and Partee’s account predictively much more specific than the GCM: instead of
asserting that values can be found for certain parameters which will yield degrees of
membership thatmatch the observations, it directly predicts these degrees of membership.
And with all the caveats that apply in light of the background assumptions (such as the
assumption of CIELUV space and the assumption that we can average over participants’
judgments), the match between predictions and observations is quite accurate. This is a
virtue that will stand even if it turns out that the GCM yields a more accurate fit—which
is by no means certain it can, although with seven parameters to be fit, it would also not
be hugely surprising.16
A comparison of Kamp and Partee’s account with Hampton’s TM leads to essentially
the same conclusion. Hampton defines graded membership as a function of similarity to
category prototype. He assumes that each concept has a determinate boundary region for
15This was suggested to us by James Hampton, for which we thank him.
16In fairness to theGCM, someparameterswill be fixed by the choice of stimuli on independent (theoretical
or empirical) grounds. For instance, for stimuli with integral dimensions (such as color stimuli) it is
commonly assumed that 2 is the appropriate value for the parameter 𝑟 in the definition of the dist function
(𝑟 = 2 turns dist into a weighted Euclidean distance function). On the other hand, it is to be noted that
later versions of the GCM have parameters in addition to the ones mentioned here, like a response-scaling
parameter which appears as an exponent of the summed similarities in the formula of the generalization of
Medin and Schaﬀer’s Context Model displayed in the text; see Ashby and Maddox (1993), Nosofsky and
Zaki (2002), and Navarro (2007).
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membership; in his notation, 𝑆L and 𝑆H are the values of the relevant similarity measure 𝑆
that constitute the lower and upper bound, respectively, of the boundary region of a given
category. 𝑆T denotes the value at which the degree of membership in that category is .5;
this is supposed to be midway between 𝑆L and 𝑆H. Then the degree of membership of an
item 𝑖 in the category,𝑀(𝑖), is defined thus:17
𝑀(𝑖) =
{{{{
{{{{
{
0 if 𝑆L ⩾ 𝑆(𝑖);
2 ( 𝑆(𝑖)−𝑆L𝑆H−𝑆L
)
2
if 𝑆T ⩾ 𝑆(𝑖) > 𝑆L;
1 − 2 ( 𝑆H−𝑆(𝑖)𝑆H−𝑆L
)
2
if 𝑆H ⩾ 𝑆(𝑖) > 𝑆T;
1 if 𝑆(𝑖) > 𝑆H.
Hampton highlights various attractive features of this proposal. For instance, it accords
with pretheoretical intuition that there are regions of determinate membership and
determinate non-membership where the membership function takes the values 1 and 0,
respectively, and the definition is also consistent with the more than plausible assumption
that items whose degree of membership is 1 can still vary in the degree to which they are
typical for the category. Moreover, it provides a straightforward solution to the problem
of second-order vagueness, that is, the fact that we do not sense sharp dividing lines, on
the one hand, between the clear and the not-so-clear members of a category and, on the
other hand, between the not-so-clear members and the clear non-members (Sainsbury,
1991; Keefe & Smith, 1997, p. 15 f). To explain this, it is enough to point out that, on the
current proposal, the transitions at the endpoints of the boundary region are perfectly
smooth, so that we cannot expect to experience any abruptness in going from the clear
members to the not-so-clear members (or the other way round) or from the not-so-clear
members to the clear non-members (or the other way round).
The TM was an important source of inspiration for the version of Kamp and Partee’s
account presented in Decock and Douven (2014). Among other things, these authors
adopted Hampton’s treatment of the issue of second-order vagueness. As they also point
out, however, while the TM at first appears very specific—what justifies the particular
choice of sigmoid functionmade in the definition of𝑀, or the suggestion that the sigmoid
function would be the same for every category?—it is actually rather unspecific, given that,
in a note, Hampton (2007, p. 381 n) distances himself from the particular definition of
graded membership given by𝑀, saying that it is meant only to serve illustrative purposes.
For our experiments, this means that the TM predicts no more than that degrees of
blueness will be 1 for any patch closer to the blue prototype than 𝑆H, 0 for any patch
further away from the blue prototype than 𝑆L, and for the patches in between will decline
in some S-shaped pattern as they are further removed from the blue prototype. Clearly,
that is what the conceptual spaces version of Kamp and Partee’s semantics predicts too
(with “prototypical blue region” replacing “blue prototype”). In addition, however, that
account predicts exactly where the boundary region begins and where it ends, as well
as what the S-shape in between looks like. If one is free to pick points 𝑆L and 𝑆H, and
17In Hampton’s definition, there occurs a > wherever we have a ⩾. That must be an oversight, as it would
make𝑀 undefined at 𝑆L, 𝑆T, and 𝑆H, which cannot be intended.
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free to choose any sigmoid function connecting those points in something like the way𝑀
does, then one will almost surely be able to obtain better fitting models than the ones
provided by Kamp and Partee’s account. But it is hard to see how this could be a point
in favor of the TM. Otherwise, why not settle on a theory according to which there is
some function—whether or not sigmoid—that describes the decline of membership in
the boundary region of a category? With virtually no constraints on the shape of the
function, we will certainly be able to get still better fitting models.
In short, there is a clear sense in which Kamp and Partee’s account is preferable to
both the GCM and the TM, to wit, it is more specific than either. At the same time,
its surplus empirical content makes it more vulnerable to refutation. We saw, however,
that the account still does quite well in light of the data gathered in our experiments.
This is important in its own right, regardless of whether extant psychological accounts
of categorization are able to explain the same data equally well (or even better). For
Kamp and Partee’s account oﬀers something in addition to an account of categorization,
being first and foremost a formal device that lets us compute truth values of sentences of
arbitrary syntactic complexity in a systematic manner, where the sentences may contain
vague predicates. No psychological account of categorization oﬀers anything close to
that, and none of the rival semantics developed by linguists and philosophers is formally
as elegant or empirically as powerful as Kamp and Partee’s.
The experiments presented in the current study were limited to two vague predicates
pertaining to the color domain. We acknowledged that this may have influenced our re-
sults. This admission suggests obvious follow-up research, namely, to rerun Experiment 1
and the first part of Experiment 2 for other colors, perhaps for all of Berlin and Kay’s
nine other basic color categories, and then to calculate anew degrees of membership for
the patches in Series 1–3. Indeed, a more general extension of the present study would
also consider series of color patches located in other regions than the blue–green region.
We also mentioned various ways in which our design could be refined. Most notably,
we expect that repeating basically the same experiments under better controlled testing
conditions and testing fully within participants—meaning that color similarity space,
locations of prototypical regions in that space, and judgments of degrees of membership
for various colors, are all determined per participant rather than at the aggregate level—
would lead to a better fit between predictions and observations. We also considered the
possibility of tweaking the conceptual spaces version of Kamp and Partee’s semantics by
assigning diﬀerent weights to the tessellations that make up a collated Voronoi diagram;
that way, diﬀerent tessellationsmightmake diﬀerent contributions to determining degrees
of membership.
Finally, given that we cannot assume that what holds for the domain of color will
hold for other domains of concepts as well, the follow-up research most urgently called
for is testing Kamp and Partee’s account using conceptual spaces other than color space.
A number of candidate spaces have been mentioned at the end of Section 2. While in
testing Kamp and Partee’s account in other domains one is likely to encounter diﬃculties
specific to that domain,18 we strongly suspect that the overall design of our experimental
18For instance, an anonymous referee noted that other sets of visual stimuli, such as facial expressions of
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work can to a large extent serve as a template for such future work. And we are even more
strongly convinced that the results of the current experiments are encouraging enough to
warrant embarking on that work.
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Appendix
In Experiment 2, degrees of blueness for the patches in the three color series were cal-
culated on the basis of diﬀerent cutoﬀ points for which points in CIELUV space were
to be included in the prototypical blue and green regions. The analyses presented in the
main part of the paper are all based on the degrees of blueness obtained by assuming the
most inclusive cutoﬀ point. It was claimed that this choice made no relevant diﬀerence.
Interested readers can verify this claim by repeating the analyses with the predicted
degrees of blueness obtained on the basis of the other cutoﬀ points, which are included
in Table A.
Table A: Degrees of blueness for the patches in Series 1–3, assuming diﬀerent cutoﬀ points
for typicality.
All Q1 Q2 Q3
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
7 1.00 1.00 0.82 1.00 1.00 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.78 1.00 1.00 0.78
8 1.00 1.00 0.08 0.98 1.00 0.01 0.99 1.00 0.02 0.99 1.00 0.05
9 0.89 1.00 0.00 0.82 0.99 0.00 0.83 1.00 0.00 0.87 1.00 0.00
10 0.57 0.94 0.00 0.49 0.89 0.00 0.49 0.90 0.00 0.54 0.92 0.00
11 0.18 0.75 0.00 0.12 0.68 0.00 0.14 0.68 0.00 0.16 0.73 0.00
12 0.03 0.44 0.00 0.01 0.37 0.00 0.02 0.37 0.00 0.02 0.42 0.00
13 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00
14 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
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